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SUMMARY: Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson’s claim that being conscious of broad-
span musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness 
of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the 
experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show 
that these two models can be reconciled through the identification of a broader notion of 
understanding. After accomplishing this reconciliation by means of my new conception, I 
will close the paper by discussing some reasons to accept an enhancing notion of musical 
understanding that includes levels and degrees of understanding. 
 




Jerrold Levinson’s central argument in Music in the Moment (1997) is that fundamental 
musical understanding can be achieved through the experience of listening to music in a 
certain way: specifically, in a concatenationist way; that is, listening to individual bits of a 
musical piece on the small-scale—just a few bars perhaps—and connecting present ones 
with previous and future ones. Levinson’s concatenationism is erected against the 
traditional view, which holds that conscious awareness of broad-span musical form and of 
large-scale structural relationships is essential to understanding music.2 Despite his 
disagreement with this view, in order to explore the possibility that the organization of a 
musical piece on the large-scale, even if not an object of perception in itself, somehow 
                     
1 I am grateful to Jerrold Levinson for helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. I am also grateful 
to the referees of the Journal Crítica for providing valuable comments that improved this paper. 
2 As applied to the arts, “form”, in general, is an important concept that refers to the shape, arrangement, 
relationship, or organization of the various elements. In music, the elements of form are rhythm, pitch and 
melody, dynamics, tone color, and texture. A musical work, such as a symphony, is formed or organized by 
means of repetitions of some of these elements and by contrasts among them. In this work, I refer to “form” 
when I say musical architecture, global form or large-scale musical structure. Nevertheless, it is important to 
remember that “a form” or “musical forms” refer to one of many standardized formal patterns, conventionally 
expressed by letter diagrams such as A B A and that are known as da capo form, fugue, sonata form, minuet 
form, theme and variations, rondo, among others (see Kerman 2000, pp. 39–41).  
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affects the listener’s experience or helps achieve understanding, Levinson sets himself to 
qualify his own concatenationism in order to take large-scale characteristics into account. 
After exploring this modified view, Levinson concludes that intellectual apprehension and 
awareness of global form can only contribute to musical understanding to a relatively minor 
degree, not in any significant way.  
My goal in this paper is to explore the possibility of enhancing the general notion of 
musical understanding3 by considering two proposals which, if adopted, would lead to a 
reconciliation of those who claim that understanding is primarily achieved by the 
experience of listening and those who claim that understanding is primarily achieved 
through analysis and awareness of musical architecture, global form, and large-scale 
musical structure. I will argue that these two views about musical understanding are not 
mutually exclusive and will show a way in which both viewpoints can be reconciled. In 
fact, the awareness of musical form is not negligible in achieving musical understanding as 
Levinson supposes. On the contrary, it significantly enhances our musical understanding. 
As we will see below, this expanded notion of understanding is perfectly compatible with 
Levinson’s qualified concatenationism. 
This essay has three sections: (1) in order to provide the most important aspects for 
the debate of the problem of musical understanding, I will outline central differences of the 
two views. (2) I will take Levinson’s argument in Music in the Moment as an example of 
experiential model. I will explain his conception of musical understanding, and point out 
the main features of his concatenationism. (3) I will argue for my proposals to broaden the 
                     
3 Despite the fact that the notion of musical understanding can be applied to any musical genre, all musical 
examples in this work will be referred to tonal classical music or concert music, as we know it in the Western 
tradition. I do this in order to avoid the common fallacy of a number of authors that pick operas or other type 
of music associated to a text and supposedly analyze the musical qualities by themselves, while in reality they 
only attend to the narrative content provided by the text.  
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notion of musical understanding, and I will show that Levinson's qualified 
concatenationism is compatible with the enhanced understanding that I present. 
 
1. Two Perspectives on Musical Understanding 
The problem posed by musical understanding has been discussed by philosophers of music 
such as Roger Scruton, Jerrold Levinson, Stephen Davies, Peter Kivy, Malcolm Budd and 
Mark DeBellis (a musicologist). The core of the problem can be seen by examining the two 
primary opposing positions: on the one hand, those who accept the necessity of an 
analytical capacity, conceptual and technical knowledge, and a consciousness of the 
musical structure as a necessary condition to understand music, on the other, those who 
argue that musical experience is a sufficient condition for achieving understanding through 
repeated listening whereby the dynamic musical forms and internal connections between 
the musical parts are intuitively detected, registered, and responded to. 
In this section, I will present those two perspectives stated more carefully. I will call 
these two positions the analytic model and the experiential model, respectively. Relying on 
C. Koopman and S. Davies (2001, pp. 266–68), I will now list some of the main differences 
between these two models, considering them in their purest form.  
 
Global vs. Local Focus: According to the analytic model, musical understanding is 
achieved by grasping the structural components of a musical work. A complete “view” of 
the work results from the identification of its parts, assuming they remain static and are not 
affected by the flow of time. On the contrary, experiential model, the musical process is 
grasped through a dynamic experience of music, which is apprehended as it happens in 
time through our ability to organize the various tones we listen to sequentially. The listener 
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reacts to a continual flow of events with a flow of corresponding responses. 
Reflective vs. Unreflective Listening: The analytic model depends on the listener 
having a reflective awareness of the work’s form, on an intellectual approach to the work, 
and on his response being articulated propositionally. The experiential model does not look 
for such awareness since it considers it to be unnecessary. The listener’s experience is 
sufficient to achieve musical understanding. 
Cognitive vs. Cognitive-Affective Bond: The analytic model is purely cognitive because 
it involves complex, intellectual mental processes, whereas the experiential model involves 
a cognitive-affective bond: In order to grasp a musical piece, the listener has to feel the 
musical progression. If the listeners lack the experience of feeling and listening to the 
musical sequences in tension and relaxation, they cannot understand the piece.  
External vs. Internal Perspective: In the analytic model, the listener’s perspective is 
distanced from the musical work—the work is viewed from the outside. The listener in the 
experiential model is required to be involved with the work in order to understand it from 
the inside through an experience that involves him “empathically” with the musical piece. 
Coherence of the Whole vs. Coherence of Parts in Connection: On the analytic model, 
the listener is aware of connections (e.g., oppositions, elaborations, and reductions) that he 
detects in the musical score and can determine the coherence of a piece by means of the 
conventions of a certain style. In contrast, in the experiential model the listener grasps the 
music as a process that develops organically, in which each part is only tied to the previous 
one. In this way, the perception of the coherence of the piece is derived from the organic 
connection of its parts. 
 
For a more concrete view of these positions, the musicologist Mark DeBellis may serve as a 
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representative for the analytic model and Jerrold Levinson as one for the experiential 
model.4 DeBellis’s central argument in Music and Conceptualization (1995, especially 
chapters 2 and 3) is that untrained listeners cannot follow a piece of music, its development 
and its fundamental structure. Hence, their experience of music is ineffable. This is 
supposed to imply an impoverishment of their understanding in comparison to trained 
listeners, who know how to conceptualize sounds in theoretical and technical terms. From 
the analytic perspective, knowledge and awareness of the musical structure is a necessary 
condition for understanding music. In contrast, Levinson maintains that in order to 
understand music, it is necessary to have a particular experience of listening. For the 
important thing on the experiential model is not what is listened to (i.e., what aspect of the 
overall structure), but how one listens; how unity and organization are perceived; the way 
in which a person listens to tones organized in a tonal system; how one appreciates and 
imaginatively participates in music; how one relates the preceding parts and anticipates the 
future ones. In sum, what matters is how we, as Roger Scruton says, transform our 
experience into an exercise, a practice, a habit (see Scruton 1997, Ch. 2).  
 
2. Levinson’s Concatenationism and Qualified Concatenationism 
The principal argument offered by Jerrold Levinson in Music in the Moment,5 is that a basic 
musical understanding is achieved in the experience of listening to music in a certain way. 
In particular, listening to individual bits of a musical piece, on a small-scale, and in the 
present time; i.e., aurally connecting present with previous and future bits, and where the 
                     
4  See also P. Kivy, 2001, pp. 183–217. To see reply to criticisms towards experiential model: J. Levinson, 
1999, pp. 485–94, and S. Davies, 2007, pp. 25–79 who compares and criticizes both, DeBellis and Levinson. 
5 An argument which may be traced basically to Edmund Gurney’s music theory (The Power of the Sound, 
1880). 
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decisive factor is the act of listening, when, in the exposition and repetition of a given 
piece, the listener responds to music. That is, when the listener follows and "makes sense" 
—i.e., connects present parts with previous and future ones—, reproduces —i.e., hums, 
whistles, sings, dances, etc.—, appreciates —i.e., perceives with attention—, esteems, and 
values the work, she understands it.6 Levinson writes,  
 
If basic musical understanding can be identified with a locally synthetic rather than 
a globally synoptic manner of hearing, then it is conceivable that with musical 
compositions, even complicated and lengthy ones, we miss nothing crucial by 
staying, as it were, in the moment, following the development of events in real time, 
engaging in no conscious mental activity of wider scope that has the whole or some 
extended portion of it as object. Of course it is rare that activity of that sort is 
entirely absent, but the point is that its contribution to basic understanding may be 
nil. (Levinson 1997, p. 29)  
 
It is important to be clear that by the adjective 'basic' in the phrase "basic musical 
understanding", Levinson means to convey that such understanding is essential to any 
apprehension of music, fundamental to any further musical understanding, and central to 
worthwhile musical experience of any kind. He does not mean to suggest that the 
understanding is simple, elementary, or rudimentary (cf. Levinson 1997a, p. 33). 
To exemplify the above view, take the famous opening motif of Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 5 in C Minor, Op. 67: {image here: Renero B. tiff.} It seems that the 
listeners do not need to be aware that the first movement is an Allegro con brio nor do they 
require consciousness of the Sonata Form structure of the whole movement, which is 
dominated by this rhythmic motif, in order to achieve basic understanding. Neither do they 
                     
6 The notion of musical understanding that Levinson (1996) maintains is closely related to music appreciation. 
Comprehension and appreciation cannot be divorced. To understand a musical work it is necessary to listen to 
it with a certain appreciation and enjoyment. For a position that doubts the felicity of the marriage between 
musical understanding and musical appreciation, see S. Davies (2007). 
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need to know that this motif forms the first theme in the exposition, initiates the bridge, 
appears as a subdued background to the lyrical and contrasting second theme, and emerges 
again in the cadence material. The listeners are not expected to be aware of things that 
could be observed in the score, like expansions of the motif in the development section, etc. 
In order to achieve a basic music understanding, they do not need to provide a technical 
explanation or conceptual description of exposition, development, or recapitulation as a 
large temporal span of the first movement. For Levinson, the listeners may achieve musical 
understanding if they are simply able to reproduce afterwards —hum, whistle, sing— the 
aforementioned motif. The listeners should be able to follow and recognize the motif as it 
undergoes numerous transformations throughout not only the first movement but the whole 
symphony, so that it would “make sense” to them. Most importantly, perhaps, the listeners 
should be able to perceive the intrinsic drama and emotional content that is conveyed by 
this simple motif in an astonishingly concise expression, which enables the composer to 
sustain high levels of tension based on different transformations of the motif. 
For Levinson, the fundamental thing is for the listener to detect and register the 
musical notes in the present and to perceive, through a constant and repeated audition, their 
interconnection, order and coherence, and to successively quasi-hear portions of a 
composition. Quasi-hearing, for Levinson, is “seeming to hear a span of music while 
strictly hearing, or aurally registering, just one element of it” (1997, p. 15, emphasis added). 
Quasi-hearing, claims Levinson, does not depend upon any conscious effort to keep before 
the mind the sound just heard, since an aural surrounding to the notes currently sounding 
constitutes itself automatically. The ear apprehends, vividly, in a musical unit that which 
goes beyond the sound “really” heard. Levinson’s concept of musical understanding, 
employable by the “ordinary” or “common” listener, stands in opposition to the analytic 
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model, which traditionally argues for the need for a “learned” understanding only attainable 
by those with a trained ear, by those who can explain or describe the musical phenomena in 
terms of theoretical concepts, formal schemes, architectonical diagrams or synoptic 
representations. 
In the later chapters of Music in the Moment, Levinson develops what he calls a 
qualified concatenationism, which is an attempt to challenge his initial argument that 
listening is sufficient for understanding by making room for the awareness of the large-
scale musical form to play an important role in understanding and in affecting the listener’s 
experience. Of possible ways to qualify his concatenationism, Levinson writes, 
Five possible grounds of qualification were addressed: (a) architectonic awareness’s 
enhancement of the perceived impressiveness of individual bits; (b) architectonic 
awareness’s enhancement of the perceived cogency of transitions between bits; (c) 
architectonic awareness’s facilitation of quasi-hearing; (d) architectonic awareness’s 
role in the perception of higher-order aesthetic properties; and (e) architectonic 
awareness’s role as a source of distinct musical satisfactions, ones [which Levinson] 
characterize[s] as intellectual.” (Levinson 2006a, p. 506) 
 
The first three grounds for qualification⎯(a), (b), (c)⎯are focused on the possible 
contribution of awareness of the architectonical form to the achievement of basic musical 
understanding. The last two⎯(d) and (e)⎯are focused on the direct role that might be 
played by such awareness in musical experience and understanding; i.e., of musical 
understanding of a more than basic sort (see Levinson 1999, p. 487). After exploring these 
qualifications and offering his qualified concatenationism, Levinson concludes that 
awareness of large-scale musical architecture only contributes to basic musical 
understanding in a small degree, and facilitates, but not in an important way, more-than-
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basic understanding.7 Of this conclusion, he writes,  
But the plain truth is that to appreciate any music of substance, the thing to do is 
listen to it, over and over again. [...] Of course to experience the content of the 
music correctly, to respond to a piece as the piece it musicohistorically is, one must 
also have listened to and digested a lot of other music, in particular, that which 
forms the generative background to the piece in question. Still, listening is the key 
[...]. Contemplation of formal patterns, apprehension of spatial wholes, intellectual 
grasp of large-scale structural relations are of an entirely different, and lesser, order 
of importance. One can readily forgo them and still have entrée to the essential. 
(Levinson 1997, p. 174–5) 
 
3. Supplementing Levinson’s Notion of Musical Understanding 
There are two principal problems with Levinson’s view: one concern his notion of musical 
understanding and the other is in regard to his concatenationism as a method of hearing. His 
notion of musical understanding is too narrow, and, although he provides a number of 
reasons to adopt his concatenationism as a plausible way to achieve a basic musical 
understanding, I will argue that any suitable listening technique must incorporate at least 
some aspects of the analytical model. Thus, the consequence of my proposals will be to 
bring about a broadening of the notion of musical understanding. I suggest that, 
 
1. The sense of “understanding” used by both the experiential and analytic model 
must be clarified (Section 3.2.1.). This clarification will allow us to see that the 
models are complementary, not mutually exclusive, as our consciousness and 
capacity of analysis enhance our experience and enjoyment. (Section 3.2.2.) 
2. Rather than insisting that the listener either achieves full musical understanding 
or none at all, it should be agreed that there are different levels and degrees of 
understanding that depend on many factors, such as the listener’s mental 
                     
7 For an elaboration of the possibilities of qualified concatenationism and specific examples of each one of 
them, see Levinson, 1997, chapters 5–8. 
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abilities and the time invested in listening (Section 3.3.) 
 
As the notion of musical understanding is widened, we are able to prevent the seemingly 
inescapable dichotomy between the experiential model and the analytic model by resolving 
the disputes between them. I claim that both sides can agree on the usefulness of more 
precise definitions of different conceptions of musical understanding, and that my 
expansion of the notion of musical understanding is also an enhancement.  My proposals, 
therefore, offer a better conception of musical understanding and provide a viable 
reconciliation between opposing views. 
 
3.1 Problems with Levinson’s Notion of Understanding 
Primarily, it is important to notice that there are at least three reasons to accept Levinson’s 
concatenationst thesis: first, music is clearly listened to through time. It makes sense, then, 
that a musical work can be understood if listened to in time; the human ear can only grasp a 
piece if listened to in the present, moment by moment after all. Second, it is not even 
possible to perceptually apprehend a musical work in its totality. The human ear cannot 
apprehend “the whole” of a work or its large-scale architecture. It can only "build" the 
whole bit by bit. Third, because Levinson seems to be right when he claims that because 
music is internally synthesizable (by means of quasi-hearing), it is possible for the listener 
to “seemingly” apprehend the whole of a musical work, albeit progressively and never all-
at-once. 
Notwithstanding Levinson’s intention of qualifying his simple concatenationism, I 
find a number of problems with his argument: 
(a) As already mentioned, his notion of understanding is too narrow because 
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Levinson a priori excludes awareness, knowledge, explanation, and description as 
necessary conditions for understanding music. 
(b) He commits himself to a false dichotomy between the analytic model and the 
experiential model, since, for him, only the latter is conducive to a basic musical 
understanding. 
(c) He fails to acknowledge that in order to enhance how one listens, it is important 
to know what one listens to. Our analytical capacity, conceptual and technical knowledge, 
and consciousness of what is listened to is non-negligible and plays a relevant role. 
 
3.2 First Proposal: a Notion of Understanding Compatible with Concatenationism 
3.2.1 Do the Experiential and Analytic Model Use the Same Definition of Understanding?  
Surprisingly, Levinson does not offer a definition of “understanding”. If, as he states, 
musical understanding is not about formal analysis of a work, nor is it achieved through 
awareness of large-scale musical form, nor when the hearers are able to offer a causal 
explanation of the musical phenomenon or describe technically and conceptually that which 
they hear, what sense of “understanding” are we talking about?  
If understanding is achieved only through listening in a certain way, then analysis, 
awareness of the large-scale musical form, and the ability to explain and describe are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for musical understanding. If awareness of the 
large-scale musical forms only minimally contributes to understanding, then we can be 
almost certain that understanding is not related to notions such as discernment, intelligence, 
or reason. On the contrary, the only decisive aspect of such an understanding is how we 
hear music⎯how we register certain aspects of the music and respond to them. Hence, 
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basic musical understanding is a species of knowing how, or procedural knowledge, not 
knowledge that, or propositional knowledge. 
Another distinction useful in discussions about musical understanding is between 
what to know and how to know (see Davies 1994, pp. 337–40). As I have mentioned, the 
former consists in a propositional knowledge, e.g., knowing that the tonic of Beethoven 
Symphony No. 3, Op. 55 Eroica is E flat major. Whereas the latter consists rather in the 
listeners' demonstrable abilities, e.g., how they are able to listen to and register how music 
unfolds in time and find expressivity, coherence, and unity in a piece (see Levinson 1997, 
p. 30). These experiences display many abilities of the listener: aural perception, detection 
of repetitions, anticipation and prediction, among others. Knowing how the music goes on, 
or “moves”, is a way of listening in a concatenationist way rather than with the goal of 
finding true propositions about the music. 
The problem with the dichotomy presented by Levinson is that it does not 
acknowledge that both of these concepts are related: it is difficult to know how if we do not 
start by knowing what. We always start by knowing what an object is, and the way of 
knowing it or how to know it then strongly depends on that first knowledge.  
Take, for instance, the third movement of Brahms’ Violin Concerto in D, Op. 77, 
allegro giocoso, ma non troppo vivace. Having precise information would certainly 
enhance our experience of following, reproducing and appreciating the piece⎯things we 
are meant to be doing on a concatenationist listening. Joseph Kerman’s precise description 
clarifies my meaning: “[g]iocoso means ‘jolly’, that first theme in this rondo, A, has a lilt 
recalling the spirited gipsy fiddling that was popular in nineteenth-century in Vienna. The 
solo violin plays the theme (and much else in the movement) in double stops, that is, in 
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chords produced by bowing two violin strings simultaneously. Hard to do well, this makes 
a brilliant effect when done by a virtuoso” (Kerman 2000, p. 296). Numerous additional 
examples could easily be mentioned, such as, knowing that Berlioz’s Symphony 
Fantastique is based on an idée fixe, which appears transfigured in each of the five 
movements of the symphony; the central part of the second movement of Beethoven’s 
Eroica symphony is structured as a dramatic fugue; and so on. It is not obvious that a 
concatenationist listener could derive this relevant information that certainly enhances the 
musical understanding of the pieces simply by listening in the moment. 
Would it not be wise to offer a definition of basic musical understanding and clarify 
in what sense it is being used? In every area of philosophy, we are constantly trying to 
distinguish between kinds of understanding: e.g., it is not the same thing to understand a 
text, a human experience, a historical event, a logical formula, a fact or a causal 
relationship. In each of logic, epistemology and hermeneutics, the technical term 
understanding is generally used, but the uses often have subtle different senses. These 
differing senses are useful here, and I will borrow a few German terms to pick them out in 
what follows.  
Let us consider different senses of “understanding” that might be called, Verstehen, 
Verstand and Erklärung.8 Verstehen refers to the meaning of experience and alludes to a 
kind of grasping, as opposed to the understanding offered by the scientific explanatory 
method. Verstand means essentially intelligence, reason or judgment. And Erklärung refers 
                     
8 A number of traditions and authors who deal with the notion of “understanding” and “comprehension” stress 
their different uses. See, for instance, K. O. Apel and G. Wamke, 1984, Understanding and Explanation: A 
Transcendental Pragmatic Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, G. H. Von Wright, 2004, Explanation and 
Understanding, Cornell University Press, NY. Husserl uses Verstehen in his account of phenomenology as 
understanding the “lifeworld” or the things which we experienced (he took the term from Kant, as well as W. 
Dilthey and H.G. Gadamer) and Kant uses Verstand as a sense of understanding in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
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to explanation and is considered to be a way of apprehending objects because it suggests a 
kind of illustration of concepts in order to make them more understandable. Given these 
different senses of “understanding”, the analytic model may be divided in two: if by 
“understanding” we mean Verstand, then the focus would be on understanding achieved 
through analysis, awareness and knowledge; if, on the other hand, we mean 
“understanding” in its Erklärung sense, then the understanding achieved when the hearer is 
able to give explanations of the musical form or of the structural coherence of the work is 
of the utmost importance. If we now suppose that the experiential model and basic musical 
understanding refer to Verstehen, while the analytic model and the understanding achieved 
in the explanation of the musical structure refer to Verstand and Erklärung, then there 
would be no place for any misunderstanding. Each model would refer to a different and 
complementary meaning of the term, understanding. Thus, we can disentangle the dispute 
between those who claim that understanding is reached through analysis and awareness of 
the musical form and those who claim that understanding is reached through the mere 
experience of listening.  
It is reasonable to infer that Levinson is thinking about the kind of understanding 
captured by Verstehen, since he emphasizes that understanding is achieved by 
apprehending; that is, in the experience of listening to music in a concatenationist way. 
However, he does not see that his basic musical understanding simply does not compete 
with understanding on the analytic model because different senses of “understanding” are 
in play.  
Levinson has suggested9 that these distinctions do not resolve the dispute because 
each of the parties already recognizes that there are different senses, meanings, or kinds of 
                     
9 Personal communication. 
 15 
understanding involved, but disagree as to (a) their relative importance, and (b) their degree 
of dependence/independence of each other. However, I believe that this acknowledgement 
of different senses of understanding has not been clearly explained in the literature. Neither 
Levinson nor DeBellis—again, as representative thinkers of each camp⎯manifestly 
recognize different kinds of understanding as such. Thus, I disagree with point (a) because 
even Levinson, with his qualified concatenationism, concludes that awareness of large-
scale musical architecture contributes to basic musical understanding only in a small 
degree, and facilitates it, but not in an important way. Levinson practically excludes any 
contribution of the analytic model in his account of musical understanding: it makes no 
significant difference whether we say that the importance of awareness and an intellectual 
approach is irrelevant in order to achieve understanding or that it is relevant in such a minor 
degree. Both assessments imply that awareness is practically irrelevant.  
The same objection applies to point (b): for supporters of the experiential model, the 
recognition of the degree of dependence on analysis in the reaching of understanding is 
negligible. In fact, Levinson means to show that it is clearly independent from the process 
of reaching musical understanding. According to my view, however, when a listener hears 
music in a concatenationist way, it is desirable and useful for him to have knowledge of 
musical theory, technical vocabulary, awareness of musical forms, etc. in order to enhance 
his musical understanding and articulate more accurately his experience.  
In short, if we assume that Levinson primarily uses this limited sense of 
understanding, it is unnecessary for him to reject the analytic model view because it is 
compatible with his own view. Basic musical understanding would constitute only one 
specific “type” of understanding.  
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3.2.2. Why is it Useful to Find a Sense of Understanding Compatible with 
Concatenationism? 
Another way to look for a sense or meaning of “understanding” compatible with 
concatenationism is by treating it as a correspondence between the experiential sphere and 
the cognitive sphere; i.e., by allowing for reconciliation between both views presented.10  
To broaden the notion of musical understanding, making the analytic and 
experiential models complementary, we must accept that, included in the mental abilities of 
the hearer, are those held to be important by the analytic model; i.e., categorization, 
conceptualization, analytical evaluation, description, etc. In the framework of a basic 
musical understanding, then, it would be essential to allow for these abilities' being 
important. Even if we do not consider them sufficient, we have to admit that knowledge, 
awareness, and other abilities are relevant to understanding music, and are more closely 
linked to experience of listening than Levinson thinks.  
At this point, it is important to make two observations. First, let us not claim that 
Levinson already holds a compromise view between the experiential model and the analytic 
model simply because his view refers to a cognitive-affective bond. Levinson only 
acknowledges that the experience of listening implies a relation between that which we 
perceive, attend to, imagine, and that which we sense, enjoy, appreciate. It is also important 
to notice that he allows only for certain cognitive abilities to play a role in the reception of 
music. For example, he does not consider crucial some of the abilities Roger Scruton does 
                     
10 I am aware that it might be objected that my argument implies the necessity and sufficiency of the analytic 
model for achieving basic musical understanding. Even though that is not so, it could be asked if my 
proposals do not invalidate at least the concatenationst view. In what follows, I will show that it would not 
only not be invalidated, that it would be usefully broadened. 
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(1997 and 1974). He does not allow the abilities of describing—at least metaphorically—or 
explicitly locating certain elements in organization to play much of a role. The next 
quotations illustrate these points:  
Those who propose the ability to offer descriptions of music as prerequisite to basic 
musical understanding make two mistakes: first, the representations in terms of 
which music is grasped may be not articulate in nature; second, even if they were, 
being able to access them after listening so as to produce descriptions of the music 
would at most be evidential, but neither necessary nor sufficient, for having had a 
hearing experience of the right sort (Levinson 1997, x–xi).  
[T]he point is that gratifying impressions of familiarity, unity-through-change, and 
the like require no conscious reflection on where or when some musical material 
was previously encountered, no active appreciation of the pattern of events, 
thematic or harmonic, as a whole. (Levinson 1997, p. 82). 
 
Qualified concatenationism claims that the intellectual pleasure obtained from 
apprehending musical form in a large-scale (a) is unnecessary to achieve basic musical 
understanding because it aims at an object different from that at which basic understanding 
aims⎯the experiential model points toward a musical work of art, whereas the analytic 
model directs listeners at a sound phenomenon open to analysis and explanation; (b) is not 
comparable with the pleasure obtained in the experience of listening, which of course 
involves awareness not of global form but of local form (see Levinson 1996, pp. 56–66), as 
well as of the expressive content which results or emerges from evolving form. 
We should keep in mind that Levinson distinguishes the pleasure obtained through 
an intellectual approach to music from the aesthetic pleasure obtained through the 
experience of listening. I emphasize this because the pleasure obtained in concatenationist 
listening implies awareness of the individual bits one listens to and what they express; that 
is, the conjunction of content and form. Still, this does not mean that Levinson accepts the 
importance of an intellectual approach to music. 
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In searching for a sense of “understanding” compatible with concatenationism, I 
have tried to argue for the possibility of the analytic and experiential models 
complementing, not excluding, one another. Both approaches to music can coexist and give 
feedback to one another since understanding has to do with perceiving or grasping the 
meaning of something, but also with conceptualizing and describing how, e.g., musical 
notes spread in time and how we find or identify their expressiveness.  
In support of this position, I propose a few possibilities, but do so while keeping in 
mind that Levinson is reacting against the views of those who plead for the analytic model; 
that is, while defending the “common” listener, who has no previous training in the matter 
and, even so, can achieve musical understanding. Now, my first claim is that even if we are 
radical supporters of the experiential model, we have to acknowledge and admit the 
importance of analysis and awareness of form, even in the small-scale, not only to 
conceptualize, identify, describe, but to follow, link and reproduce the different bits. To 
follow, link and reproduce, they who listen in the moment need a certain awareness and a 
more complex mental process to come into play; that is, to identify certain notes or 
individual bits and be able to follow them, the inexperienced listener must essentially hear 
with an awareness of time and space or of the moment in which the bits go by. What would 
happen to concatenationism if parts of the analytic model were accepted in order to achieve 
musical understanding? Would the experiential model cease to be concatenationist? 
Focusing on the second possibility in what follows, I will try to demonstrate that awareness 
enhances our experience and, therefore, our musical understanding.  
My second claim is that if we accept that the human ear can detect certain elements 
of the music’s organization or coherence (by means of apprehending the musical 
relationships of bits on the small-scale and moment by moment, as Levinson proposes), I 
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believe that the concatenationist method does not prevent the listener from developing a 
detailed analysis of bits of the musical structure in order to be aware of the technical scope 
of a work. Likewise, our awareness, knowledge and analysis of the musical form do not 
subtract anything valuable from our experience. In fact, the listener would not cease to have 
the experience of listening, or cease to pay attention to and minutely analyze what he listens 
to at each moment in a concatenationist manner. In this way, he could complement his 
experience with an analysis and achieve an enriched basic musical understanding. 
For instance, any person can experience when sound goes from loud to soft. If a 
listener were aware of many different gradations that exist in an actual piece of music or 
passage, though, the experience of the passage would be enriched. If we listen to—in a 
concatentationist way—the beginning of the Smetana’s Overture to The Bartered Bride and 
reflect on dynamics, we find: 0’00”: opening outburst, full orchestra, fortissimo. 0’11”: 
Sudden change to quiet rustling produced by violins, subito piano. 0’24”: Three 
appearances of a short, gruff bit of music spaced out from one another, each forte. 1’14”: 
Crescendo. 1’19”: Culmination in a rowdy dance, the polka, fortissimo again. 1’22”: 
Return to the quiet rustling, mezzo forte.11 
Our experience of this piece would be enhanced if we were to reflect on concepts 
and analysis during a concatenationist hearing. Following the last example, having the 
experience of the music and understanding it has not only to do with its expressivity due to 
its dynamics, but also with our consciousness, analysis and technical knowledge of those 
properties that enhance our understanding. In other words, we have good reasons to accept 
that the experiential and analytical models are compatible, and that their combination 
                     
11 J. Kerman develops an interesting analysis of listening to Smetana’s Overture to The Bartered Bride, in 
Kerman, et. al., 2000, p. 4. 
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results in a more complete musical understanding. That is, first, that the listener has a 
certain awareness of the notes related with dynamics that he or she listens to in a precise 
moment. Second, that the listener is able to conceptualize, in a certain way, some individual 
parts in order to focus on and listen to aspects in progress of various music passages. This 
listening to the dynamics and analyzing them does not reduce our experience, but on the 
contrary, strengthens it.  
Levinson has objected to my considerations by saying that this would not be basic 
musical understanding obviously, but rather “higher” or non-basic musical understanding. I 
agree that mine would be an enhanced notion of musical understanding. Nevertheless, 
following Levinson’s own thought on the subject, the term 'basic' in "basic musical 
understanding" such as he defines it does not mean elemental, but rather fundamental for 
any further understanding: by “the adjective ‘basic’ [...] I mean to convey that such 
understanding is essential—to any apprehension of music—, fundamental—to any further 
musical understanding—, and central—to worthwhile experience of any kind—but not that 
it is simple, or elementary, or rudimentary” (Levinson 1997, p. 33). 
Now the question is whether or not my sense of musical understanding is 
compatible with Levinson’s qualified concatenationism? He reflected on the possibilities of 
the awareness of the large-scale musical form facilitating or contributing to the hearing or 
quasi-hearing. However, awareness, analysis and technical knowledge of the form in a 
small-scale—note by note or moment by moment—would allow for a legitimate qualified 
concatenationism. I think we have good reasons to admit that the analytic model and the 
experiential model do complement each other, if we now accept that both possibilities are 
relevant for a broader musical understanding.  
I claim that (1) finding a meaning of musical understanding compatible with 
 21 
concatenationism may clarify the position that we as listeners, proponents of the analytic 
model or the experiential model, philosophers or musicologists want to hold, and that 
because it resolves the false dichotomy between what is and what is not understanding, it is 
even more worthwhile to do so; (2) adopting the Verstehen meaning for the basic musical 
understanding proposed by Levinson shows a way out of the disputes with the supporters of 
the analytic model; and (3) using qualified concatenationism as a plausible way of 
understanding music through analysis, technical knowledge and awareness of the small-
scale form significantly complements understanding achieved through experience. 
There is no way of proving that the mechanisms employed by the analytic model 
and the experiential model are as independent in the act of listening as the debate assumes. 
If I, as a “common” listener, hear constantly and repeatedly the same piece, even though 
my first approach was without awareness or knowledge of the musical form, after many 
times, a moment will arrive in which I detect certain aspects of the form⎯through listening 
I will be able to deduce certain musical features constitutive of the structure. How much 
does this contribute to my understanding though?12 Levinson would say that it is generally 
very little. Nevertheless, my goal is to enhance basic musical understanding beyond simple 
temporal order and to show that musical satisfaction with a piece is relevant to our 
experience of listening to music. I think that as much as we can detect and deduce 
constitutive elements, our satisfaction in listening to music piece will be greater.  
Moreover, I claim that the idea of musical architecture or musical form not only is 
related with the analytical, but also with experiential model. We can experience form 
through short phrases and by following their repetitions and contrasts, which eventually 
provide us a microcosm of musical form. Kerman is right when he maintains that a large-
                     
12 A question raised by Levinson in a personal communication. 
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scale composition like a symphony is something like a greatly expanded tune, and its form 
is experienced in basically the same way.  
Form in art also has a good deal to do with is emotional quality: it is a mistake to 
consider form as merely structural or intellectual matter. Think of the little (or big) 
emotional “click” we get at the end of a limerick, or a sonnet, where the 
accumulated meanings of the words are summed up with the final rhyme. This is an 
effect to which form —limerick form or sonnet form— contributes. Similarly, when 
at the end of a symphony a previously heard melody comes back, with new 
orchestration and new harmonies, the special feeling this gives us emerges from a 
flood of memory; we remember the melody from before, in its earlier version. That 
effect, too, is created by musical form (Kerman 2000, pp. 39–40). 
 
Regardless of whether or not you are an ordinary listener, without knowledge, large-scale 
form-awareness, or ability in analysis, after constantly and repeatedly listening, it is 
impossible not to go through cognitive processes which involve mental representations of 
the music. Even though such representations are not directly observable, we infer their 
existence and nature until we notice them, hear them, memorize them and reproduce them. 
Finally, there is not an explicit divorce between the technical and the non-technical in 
music⎯between the form and the features of the form. The simple act of constantly and 
repeatedly listening will eventually produce knowledge of the structural and technical 
features of the music and of its global form.13 As Sloboda argues, evidence suggests that 
listeners without musical training do have an implicit knowledge of that which 
musicologists can talk about explicitly (1997, p. 3). 
 
3.3 Second Proposal: Accepting Levels and Degrees of Musical Understanding 
If the false dichotomy between the experiential model and the analytic model is removed, 
                     
13 For an interesting discussion about a right listener’s background of knowledge and practice, see J. 
Levinson, 1990. See also P. Kivy 1990, S. Davies 1994, and R. Scruton 1997, all of which include extended 
discussion of this topic. 
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several shades of understanding can be now appreciated. It is possible to see that there is 
not only one way of understanding music, but rather there are several levels, degrees and 
aspects of understanding. My second proposal is that inside one basic musical 
understanding there is room to distinguish between levels and degrees of understanding. 
Why would distinguishing levels and degrees of understanding within basic musical 
understanding be plausible? Levinson himself sheds light on this when (a) he argues that 
the hearer’s abilities to follow and reproduce are a compelling sign of musical 
understanding and can be obtained through an attentive act of—concatenationist—
listening; and (b) when he observes that basic musical understanding can be achieved when 
the hearer listens to a musical piece closely and repeatedly; i.e., when the hearer positions 
himself in the right music-historical space and listens with attention, constancy and 
repetition to a piece until he becomes very familiar with it. From this, I infer that levels and 
degrees of understanding can be explained as follows: 
 
(a) One aspect of a listener's understanding accords with his mental abilities; e.g., 
ceteris paribus understanding is not the same with a hearer who identifies the instruments 
in Smetana’s Overture and the different tone colors at each moment, as with a hearer who 
hardly distinguishes between string instruments. These listeners both achieve 
understanding, but at different levels.  
Consider another section of The Bartered Bride Overture as heard by a listener who 
can differentiate instrumental tone colors. He or she will listen to the passage and 
experience the music's flow with the tone color changing every five seconds or so and the 
theme changing suddenly when it is played by different instruments, each with its own 
characteristic tone color. The listener would hear something like, at 2’59” there are three 
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drum strokes and an outburst: timpani, then massed woodwinds. 3’04”: Part 2 of the 
outburst theme—massed string instruments, timpani. 3’09”: Quiet rustling, violins playing 
together. 3’11”: The theme, four spurts of music, violas. 3’16”: Theme again, this time 
carried by a clarinet. 3’21”: Third theme, two flutes. 3’26”: Theme, fourth time: oboe with 
a bassoon below. 3’40”: So many instruments are playing that tone colors are hard to 
distinguish (see Kerman 2000, p. 5). Here we have a different level of understanding than 
that achievable by someone who cannot distinguish between tone colors.  
 
(b) Another aspect of a listener's understanding accords with the time and constancy 
spent in hearing; e.g., ceteris paribus understanding is not the same for a hearer who 
attentively listens to Bruckner’s Eighth Symphony twice a week for a year and for one who 
listens to it twice in a year. Both of them can achieve a basic musical understanding, but 
different degrees of it.  
In this respect also, every time we hear the symphony, we find different properties 
and qualities of the musical work. Our ear becomes more acute and sophisticated and we 
understand the piece to a more complex degree. For example, the listeners can identify the 
accompaniment of tremolando strings in the scherzo, pulsating string chords in D flat, over 
which violins have an expressive hymn-like theme in the adagio. Alternatively, more 
generally they notice the themes to which a movement returns, phrase repetitions, as well as 
apprehending the theme's articulation. 
We can justify the proposal for identifying different levels of understanding as 
follows:14 We know that concatenationst listening implies attention to the musical present, 
but there are other elemental aspects to which the hearer must pay attention. In order to 
                     
14 See (Davies 2007, pp. 25–79). 
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understand, the hearer should be able to: distinguish music from non-musical noise or from 
sounds unconnected with the piece; recognize when a piece is beginning and when it is 
coming to a close, so that they can tell when a performance breaks down or stops 
unexpectedly; recognize repetitions, where and when they occur, and be able to identify the 
earlier themes even if the repetition is not exact; register the waxing and waning of musical 
tension and movement and the expressive character of the music; predict how the music 
will continue and distinguish between an unanticipated but appropriate continuation and a 
performance blunder; experience the music as unfolding in a “logical” way. Most of these 
capacities can be characterized in a concatenationist way. Hence, it is not possible to 
believe that every listener has the same ability to listen to music. So, although it would be 
difficult or impossible to exactly measure and quantitatively determine someone’s level of 
musical understanding, we can accept that not everybody achieves the same basic musical 
understanding, even if we are listening to music in a concatenationist way. 
As for the time and effort spent listening, (b), Levinson sheds light on the possibility 
of identifying degrees of understanding. If he does not make this suggestion explicitly, he at 
least implies it when he emphasizes the importance of listening closely and repeatedly to a 
music piece. How long must one listen before achieving basic musical understanding? It 
depends on many factors. For example (differing from Levinson) Davies correctly 
emphasizes the importance of the preparation of the appreciative musical listener, which 
cannot rest alone with what he can grasp unreflectively, simply by attending to music. He 
also stresses that, in order to reach a deeper understanding, the hearer needs certain 
information⎯some idea of the course of music history, genres and styles, etc. (Davies 
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2007, pp. 25–79).15 
It is not easy to reach consensus as to when the hearer achieves a certain degree of 
understanding, how to measure the degree of understanding achieved, or what exactly is a 
degree. I accept this difficulty, as it is also difficult to determine somebody’s knowledge of 
music, or how well listeners can analyze a work. Nevertheless, I still think that we can 
admit knowledge as well as degrees, and that we can regard as an important variable to 
enhanced musical understanding the time that the hearer devotes to listening—even though 
listening twice as many times certainly does not guarantee twice the understanding. 
Musical understanding is not the same for everybody: there are different levels and 
degrees of understanding since listeners apprehend different “parts of musical meaning” 
according to their abilities of listening and the time they spend on it. One of these parts is 
related to the purely internal connections of the music, its kinetic and dynamic content, and 
the other part has to do with the expressive elements of the music, its emotional and 
dramatic content.16 In this sense, basic musical understanding permits a grasp of both 
musical movement and extramusical expression. In such a way, basic musical 
understanding is correlative with basic musical meaning. 
Finally, let me suggest that qualified concatenationism considered as a tool for 
listening and achieving a basic musical understanding, can do the work that an intellectual 
approach requires: we can know, analyze and be aware of the small-scale form, and we can 
infer the large-scale form from this. Qualified concatenationism also answers the 
requirements of levels and degrees of musical understanding, and it would be possible to 
achieve basic musical understanding notwithstanding the mental states in which we 
                     
15 Levinson calls a listener’s background formation in his “Musical Literacy”, ibid. 
16 Levinson (1997, p. 34) supports this idea from the argument of Roger Scruton: “Notes on the Meaning of 
Music” (1993). 
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approach a work, or what purposes we pursue by listening to it. The full details of how 
qualified concatenationism can pull this off, however, must be postponed to a later work.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have agreed that the idea of concatenationism is a very convincing way of 
hearing music. Drawing on a qualified version of concatenationism, I explored the 
possibility of expanding the notion of musical understanding by means of two proposals 
which led to a resolution of the disagreement between those who claim that understanding 
is achieved by the experience of listening and those who claim that understanding is 
achieved through analysis and awareness of musical architecture or large-scale musical 
structure. I argued that there is no real dichotomy between the experiential model and the 
analytic model, and I showed a way in which aware and analytical understanding can not 
only complement our experience of music, but also allow us to enhance this understanding. 
The new view that I presented in this paper not only captures important parts of 
what both models originally had in mind, but also gives a more accurate picture of the 
process of listening with understanding. “Understanding” implies a complicated mix of the 
three senses that I explained (Verstehen, Verstand and Erklärung), and neither the analytic 
nor the experiential model had recognized this. Given that, the three aspects of 
“understanding” are there and are important for basic musical understanding; both the 
development of complex mental processes, including the conscious effort to connect 
fragments of music and the repeated listening can contribute to increase our understanding. 
 Thus, in order to broaden Levinson’s notion of music understanding, I proposed 
that levels and degrees of understanding could be defined in reference to mental abilities, 
and to the time and dedication spent in hearing, respectively. Regarding these points, 
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Levinson’s qualified concatenationism, besides being a very useful way of listening to 
music and experiencing it, is already compatible with the enhanced understanding that I 
have presented.  
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